Senator Blocking US-Australia Submarine Deal Has a Good Point

There’s so much to like about AUKUS, the submarine-focused security pact between America, Australia and Britain. That agreement is revolutionizing defense-industrial cooperation among the democracies. It is a model for alliances in the 21st century, as the North Atlantic Treaty Organization was in the 20th.

There’s also one huge problem: As things stand, the US and its allies can’t produce the nuclear-powered attack submarines the pact demands. So in an act of constructive obstruction, Senator Roger Wicker, a Mississippi Republican, is trying to spur resolution of that issue by forcing a long-delayed response to the larger crisis of American sea power.

When AUKUS was first announced two years ago, the initiative — which involves helping Australia build a fleet of nuclear-power attack submarines — was bold but gauzy. Since then, details have emerged.

The participating nations envision a three-phase approach, which involves (1) the US and Britain stationing their own attack subs in Australia starting in 2027; (2) Washington selling Australia several Virginia-class attack subs in the early 2030s; and (3) the building of new AUKUS-class submarines featuring a British design and loads of US technology by 2042.

Meanwhile, the allies will cooperate on other military initiatives, from using AI to close “kill chains” to stationing more American air and sea power at Australian bases. The project involves novel forms of technological cooperation, so the White House and AUKUS supporters on Capitol Hill are seeking to exempt Australia and the UK from onerous rules governing the transfer of sensitive technology produced by the US.

AUKUS will be among the most ambitious multilateral defense projects in American history — and one that reflects critical imperatives of modern competition.

It shows that the US and its allies are starting seriously to integrate their defense industrial bases, which is crucial if they are to churn out the weapons they might need a conflict against China. In the 20th century, an industrially dominant America was the arsenal of democracy; in the 21st century, the US needs help from its friends.

Through AUKUS, moreover, America and its allies are doubling down in a military domain they still dominate — undersea warfare — even as China’s multidecade naval buildup transforms the balance at sea. Not least, AUKUS underscores a new model of cooperation for a new era of rivalry.

During the Cold War, US strategy centered on a single overarching alliance, NATO, in the world’s most important region, Europe. Yet the Sino-American rivalry is playing out primarily in Asia, where Washington lacks a region-wide alliance that makes an attack on one an attack on all.

Effective balancing will require arraying friendly nations into smaller, overlapping coalitions that can exert decisive influence on crucial issues. The US, Japan and the Netherlands recently agreed to wage technological cold war by restricting the sale of highly advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment to China. AUKUS is the outstanding military example of this effort to create overlapping webs of resistance that constrain Beijing.

Whether it will work is another issue. America’s submarine industry, like much of its defense industrial base, is in disrepair due to prolonged underinvestment. America produces 1.2 attack submarines per year, as opposed to the two it currently aims to build. Maintenance backlogs mean the Navy can’t keep enough of its existing boats at sea.

But for now, the sale of existing US submarines to Australia will further strain the American fleet, just as the retirement of aging submarines later this decade shrinks that fleet from 49 boats — already well short of the 66 the Navy says it requires — to 46 in 2030.

As Wicker noted in a recent opinion column, as well as in a letter signed by over 20 colleagues, the US would need to produce 2.3 to 2.5 attack submarines annually to “keep the commitment made under AUKUS, and not reduce our own fleet.” So Wicker has blocked plans to expedite Congressional approval of submarine sales to Australia, bringing the momentum AUKUS had gathered to a halt.

Yet Wicker isn’t or seeking to derail an initiative he rightly calls “vital.” He and his colleagues want to force the US to fund a long-term submarine-building plan sufficient to meet the need.

That plan is a long time coming. For more than a decade, it has been clear that the US Navy — not just the submarine fleet — is insufficient to meet the Chinese challenge. But budgetary constraints, bureaucratic squabbles and competing priorities have prevented the required investments from materializing. Now, time is running very short, given that it takes six to seven years to build each Virginia-class sub.

As Eric Sayers of the American Enterprise Institute told me, “Wicker’s stand on AUKUS is really part of a larger debate on American sea power.” He is “using the leverage this moment offers” to force a reckoning that is years overdue.

It’s the right stand for Wicker to take, even if the alliance dynamics are awkward. Neither AUKUS, nor the US Navy, nor the free world more broadly, will prosper unless America gets serious about sea power again.